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1 Country context and justification1
Yemen was pushed to the breaking point in 2011
by multiple emergencies prompted, in part, by a
protracted political crisis that developed in
connection with the Arab Spring protest cycles.
Civil unrest occurred against a backdrop of
chronic underdevelopment, with Yemen posting
some of the worst indicators for children both
regionally and globally. Even before the crisis,
poverty ran deep and reflected entrenched social
inequalities, with rural poverty estimated at
47.6 per cent versus urban poverty at 29.9 per
cent in 2009.2 Political unrest also exacerbated
pre-existing political and tribal tensions, which
sparked heightened levels of violence in at least
seven of Yemen’s 21 governorates, including
Abyan, Aden, Amran, Hajjah, Al-Jawf, Sana’a,
and Taiz.
The crisis triggered dramatically higher food,
water and fuel prices that hit Yemen’s most
vulnerable households hardest.3 By mid-2011,
programme colleagues had begun reporting
anecdotal evidence suggesting that many Yemeni
families were responding to the shocks by
resorting to negative coping strategies,
including: removing their children from school;
sending young boys to work while young girls
were married off; as well as decreasing the
number of meals, reducing protein intake, and
increasing qat chewing. With respect to nutrition,
families’ inability to absorb food price shocks led
to a rapid deterioration in under-five nutrition,
especially in high-risk pockets of the country. In
Al-Hodeidah governorate, for example, findings
from a nutrition survey conducted in October
2011 showed a GAM4 rate of 31.7 per cent, far
exceeding the emergency threshold of 15 per
cent.5 The breakdown of social services as a
result of the unrest created conditions whereby
addressing the intensifying problems connected
to children’s health, nutrition and protection
became even more challenging.
While humanitarian needs assessments of
internally displaced people (IDPs) and their host
communities provided some information about
how the above challenges were affecting a segment
of the vulnerable population, no data existed on
how non-displaced poor households’ coping
mechanisms were holding up in the face of rapidly
deteriorating conditions. Despite clear indications
that poverty was worsening since 2000, Yemen
lacked a coherent poverty monitoring system at any
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level.6 The last national-level household surveys,
the Household Budget Survey and the Multiple
Indicator Cluster Survey, moreover, were
conducted in 2005/06, while projections about
population demographics are based on estimations
from the 2004 census. Routine data collection by
key ministries such as Health and Education,
where it exists at all, is chronically unreliable
and untimely. In addition to these underlying
weaknesses, the offices and warehouses of the
Ministry of Health and the General Authority on
Rural Water and Sanitation were heavily shelled
and subsequently looted throughout the summer
of 2011, further constraining the ability of the
government of Yemen to identify and respond to
humanitarian needs. Thus, at a time when the
health and wellbeing of households living on the
margins was most threatened, humanitarian
actors and national counterparts lacked the most
basic information that could be used to trigger a
response.
Motivation for the monitoring project, then,
derived from concern over the negative impact
the above challenges were having on vulnerable
families. The sense among UNICEF programme
staff was that the rapid increase in prices of food,
fuel and water, coupled with the breakdown of
social services and a lack of resilience among
vulnerable Yemeni households would produce a
large-scale ‘silent’ emergency. In a data-scarce
environment, the clear challenge was how to
anticipate answers to the four ‘W’s:
z for Whom were coping mechanisms failing
(among marginalised ethnic groups, female-
headed households, or throughout the
universe of the at-risk population);
z Where were coping mechanisms failing (in
specific geographic locations, urban versus
rural areas, or more uniformly across the
country);
z What specific ways were coping mechanisms
failing (were certain deprivations more
prevalent than others); and
z When were coping mechanisms failing
(required setting benchmarks as a trigger for
humanitarian response)?
The monitoring project sought to fill the
information gap by providing panel data, taken
at biweekly intervals, among beneficiaries of the
government of Yemen’s Social Welfare Fund
(SWF). Begun as a pilot in late June 2011, the
project queried 120 households in three
governorates using a standard questionnaire that
included questions on food security, nutrition,
child protection, and WASH. Education was not
included within the survey since the academic
year had ended just as the monitoring project
was launched.
2 From conceptualisation to implementation
In order to test the viability of the project and
the utility of various data collection tools,
UNICEF Yemen planned the survey project in
phases: a six-month pilot phase in 2011, followed
by scaling up to the national level in 2012. The
pilot phase was further divided into two three-
month implementation cycles that began with a
paper-based intake system and segued into an
electronic-based system.
For the pilot, data collection from 120 households
in three targeted governorates (Sana’a, Amran
and Al-Hodeidah) was conducted in coordination
with a national NGO, The Democracy School,
which had close partnerships with smaller local
NGOs in the three locations. The Democracy
School was selected based on its past experience
conducting field research for other organisations,
its broad network of sister-NGOs throughout the
country, and its relative political neutrality, an
important factor in the polarised climate of 2011.
In each governorate, data collection was
coordinated by a field supervisor and two female
enumerators, while a main focal point in the
national NGO oversaw the work of the three
governorate teams. Data collection was done on
a biweekly basis for a period of six months.7 The
main data collection tool is a structured
interviewer-assisted questionnaire. In all cases,
respondents are the main female care-providers
within the identified households. The
questionnaire is divided into five main parts:
z Section one – intake questions on housing and
household members’ characteristics, school
enrolment, exam attendance, as well as child
protection questions related to FGM/C,8 and
birth registration. Intake questions were
administered only once, at the first round of
collection;
z Section two – food security and nutrition;
z Section three – child protection;
z Section four – water and sanitation; and
z Section five – child health.
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2.1 Sampling methodology
In cooperation with The Democracy School,
UNICEF identified three governorates, Sana’a,
Amran and Al-Hodeidah, from which to pull
households for the pilot phase. The three
governorates are not necessarily representative
of all Yemen, but it was crucial, given the time
limitations for preparations, and given the very
difficult security situation around the country, to
start the pilot in relatively accessible areas. In
each governorate, poor sub-districts (uzla) were
selected per the poverty mapping based on the
Household Budget Survey 2005/06. Within these
selected sub-districts, 40 households were
identified among those that are enrolled in the
SWF cash transfer programme.
From the outset, UNICEF Yemen took the
decision to exclude IDPs and refugees from the
sample. In fact, the sample design by itself
excludes this group, since the targeted
households in the pilot survey were selected from
the SWF beneficiary database. This decision was
based on a number of factors. First, refugees and
IDPs typically have already had their needs
assessed and receive some level of assistance
based on those needs. The survey, on the other
hand, aimed to assess how a typical, poor Yemeni
family with less access to outside assistance was
coping with the price shocks and other
challenges. Since the SWF had recently
undergone a means-test to determine the
eligibility of its beneficiaries, UNICEF Yemen
felt relatively confident that by including only
the worst-off categories among the beneficiary
list, it was capturing some of Yemen’s most
vulnerable families. Refugees and IDPs, on the
other hand, come from varying backgrounds and
may or may not be poor or otherwise unable to
access necessary goods and services. Second, for
reasons of comparability, UNICEF Yemen was
concerned to purposively sample from a
population with similar characteristics. Third, to
respond to time pressure to begin
implementation as soon as possible, UNICEF
Yemen sought to piggyback off SWF’s list, which
not only included basic data about the relative
deprivations of the household, but provided
addresses and other information that facilitated
fieldworkers’ contact with the families.
2.2 Data collection, entry and analysis
As noted, the survey instrument consists of
questions relevant to UNICEF programming
concerns, which are grouped into five sections.
Questions were developed in close consultation
with Programme Sections and field tested by the
NGO partner in a poor neighbourhood in Sana’a
during a four-day training workshop prior to the
survey’s launch. The workshop, held two weeks
before the first round of data collection, included
sessions on:
z describing the overall purpose of the project
and the specific contribution of the data
collectors;
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Box 1 Going the extra mile: data collection in rural Amran
Descriptions of project implementation processes – meetings, sampling, pre-testing of
survey instruments, and various rounds of data collection – provide certain kinds of
information about how to establish a vulnerability monitoring project. Reality on the
ground, however, brings into sharp relief what it means to the data collector who must
access remote households with few connections to basic infrastructure.
In rural Amran governorate, for example, the young women hired as data collectors faced
substantial physical challenges in reaching their target households. Located in a difficult-
to-reach mountainous area, the local communities selected for the survey are not
accessible by road. As a result, data collectors, in full nikhab in compliance with local
religious/cultural custom, walked approximately 7km, up steep mountain paths, to reach
the respondents in this survey. Remarkably, they accomplished this every two weeks, on
time, and without fail.
Dedication such as this exemplified the spirit of commitment that drove the project’s
overall success, but also points to the inherent challenges of implementing a survey that
seeks to reach the most vulnerable in a state with weak infrastructure penetration and
which ranks toward the bottom of the Human Development Index.
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z delineating the roles, relationships and means
of communication among the various actors
within the project;
z agreeing upon a timeline for collection and
analysis;
z reviewing all questions to ensure a common
understanding of what was intended;
z agreeing upon the means of entry into the
community and gaining informed consent of
the targeted household; and
z pre-testing and refining the instrument.
The first round of data collection began on
29 June 2011. Each data collector was assigned
20 households, which were interviewed over the
course of four days and included in every
subsequent round. Responses were recorded on a
paper-based questionnaire by the data collectors
and later entered into an Excel file. Immediately
following the completion of the first round of
data collection, data collectors and their
supervisors were brought together again in
Sana’a for a debrief about implementation of the
survey instrument, and refinements where
necessary, as well as communication, logistics
and support.
From the outset, UNICEF Yemen had considered
deploying SMS technology and distributing cell
phones to the targeted families from the
beginning of the project, but sporadic cell phone
coverage9 and high rates of female illiteracy –
especially in rural areas and among the lowest
wealth quintiles – ruled out this strategy. While
UNICEF Yemen was interested in exploring
various electronic-based data entry systems, it
opted to begin the survey with a paper-based
system to get the project up and running as
quickly as possible. By dividing the pilot into two
phases, UNICEF Yemen was able to start
publishing valuable data and analysis while it
continued researching and developing the best
electronic data entry solution.
Once fieldwork was completed, data entry,
cleaning and analysis took, on average, two
weeks from completion of the fieldwork until
delivery of the analytic reports to UNICEF. The
first reports, moreover, required significant
editing and further data cleaning. While the
investment of time made by UNICEF to work
with the NGO to improve the reports
contributed to strengthening national capacity
for such analysis, it proved to be a heavy burden
on the section’s staff. As a result, after the first
four rounds of data collection, UNICEF hired a
dedicated project manager, a former manager
within the Yemeni government’s Central
Statistical Organisation, to support the NGO
and expand their analytic capacity.
The second phase of the pilot began with round
seven of the data collection, with the
introduction of iPad technology to replace the
paper-based system.10 During the first phase of
the pilot, UNICEF Yemen identified a local
commercial business, Prodigy Solutions, with
strong experience supporting development
partners’ implementation of national surveys.
Prodigy Solutions was responsible for
programming the questionnaire into an
electronic format, which was uploaded onto six
iPads, which the company rented to UNICEF.
Prodigy provided training to the data collectors
through a five-day course in early September and
offered 24/7 technical support throughout the
duration of their six-month contract. With the
iPads, data collectors were able to enter
household responses directly into data files,
which were uploaded into a common dataset
within SPSS every evening during the collection
phase. After the four-day fieldwork, Prodigy sent
the consolidated SPSS file to The Democracy
School for preparation of the analytic report.
Overall, the introduction of the iPads reduced
the amount of time from data collection to
submission of the report from three weeks to one
and improved rates of data entry error.
A field visit by UNICEF staff to one of the sites
in Amran governorate in January 2012 provided
valuable information on project implementation,
including reactions to the survey of responding
households’ family members and community
leaders, as well as challenges to implementation
not recognised earlier. Significantly, through the
visit, UNICEF learned that local tribal sheiks
who control the settlements where the
respondents live viewed the project with
suspicion, particularly the introduction of the
iPads (which were seen as potential tools for
covert surveillance/spying). In addition to this
finding, UNICEF also gathered critical
information for other areas of programmatic
response, including child protection and
education, which have formed the basis for
follow-up action by Programme Sections.
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3 Results of the survey and its use
3.1 Overview of select survey results
Survey results both confirmed expectations about
how the 2011 crisis was affecting vulnerable
Yemeni households, as well as offered a few
surprises.
When panel data were aggregated over the
course of the six months of 2011, as expected,
conflict and food security were closely correlated
for the total sample as well as for each
governorate subsample, based on analysis done
by IFPRI.11 The correlation is highest in the
sample from urban Al-Hodeidah and lowest from
rural Amran. Furthermore, when dividing the
total sample into households affected by conflict
and non-affected households and showing the
trends in food insecurity of the two household
groups separately, the data reveals that the food
situation among affected households is much
more volatile.
The food security situation appears to have
drastically deteriorated, also in areas that are
not directly subjected to violent clashes. Indirect
transmission mechanisms likely are the influx of
IDPs, conflict-generated price surges, and severe
fuel shortages. IFPRI’s econometric estimation12
results suggest that expanding conflict clearly
increases food insecurity, while the general risk
of conflict in one’s neighbourhood seem to
matter more for the individual household than
the direct exposure to conflict. In addition, the
household food security level seems to respond
instantaneously for the most part, as
insignificant or relatively weak coefficients of the
lagged variables imply.
Despite fluctuations such as these, some
constant trends were evident throughout 2011:
most notably, almost none of the rural
households reported any protein intake (red
meat, fish or chicken) among children aged less
than five years during the six-month reporting
period, while only 8.8 per cent of urban
households enjoyed protein intake. In addition,
60 per cent of rural households reported
decreased meals among children less than age
five compared to those in urban areas at 40.8 per
cent. Furthermore, the survey was extremely
sensitive to small changes in household food
intake, demonstrating sharp increases in food
availability in the rounds occurring during
Ramadan, when charitable giving to poor
families often includes the donation of food for
ritualised meals such as iftar, as well as after the
quarterly distribution of cash transfers from the
SWF.
With respect to health indicators, the monitoring
project very early on captured an increase in the
prevalence of coughs, fevers and rashes among
children that signal possible measles outbreak.
Other data, such as prevalence of reported
diarrhoea among children, did not correlate as
expected with a household’s access to water –
with urban households reporting higher
incidences of diarrhoea than rural areas despite
greater access to water. Results such as this
indicate that while quantities of water may be
less in rural areas, other mitigating factors such
as better water safety or safer cooking or food
storage may be higher than in urban centres.
Finally, while some kinds of data require
observation over time to note trends, other
questions yielded interesting results even from
the first round of collection. For example, within
the first round in late June 2011, 76 per cent of
respondents reported sufficient amounts of
drinking water in the two weeks leading up to
the survey. When queried about the amount of
water (for all purposes – drinking, personal
hygiene, house cleaning, etc.) households used,
however, responses indicated that most families
in the survey subsist on 16 litres/person/day, an
amount that barely meets the emergency
threshold of 15 litres/person/day. Results like this
illustrate the need for caution when employing
humanitarian needs assessments that rely on
perceptions, such as WHO’s newly developed
Humanitarian Emergency Settings Perception of
Needs Scale (HESPER). Assessments such as this
must take into account that vulnerable
households’ pre-crisis starting point may very
well be below emergency standards, with
corresponding negative implications for other
areas such as health and nutrition, regardless of
whether the affected household perceives an
unmet need.
3.2 Survey use by colleagues and partners
The analytic report, along with several tables of
key indicators (disaggregated per governorate
over time) is distributed to a list of approximately
100 recipients via email within 24 hours of being
finalised. The list includes UNICEF staff in the
Yemen Country Office (YCO), MENA Regional
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Office, and New York Headquarters, as well as
government and UN partners, bilateral and
multilateral donors, embassies, local and
international NGOs, think tanks and journalists.
Results from the survey are occasionally posted
on Yemen Country Office’s Facebook page, and
have contributed to descriptions of the situation
of vulnerable households in a number of key
documents, including YCO’s Monthly Situation
Report, OCHA’s Consolidated Appeal 2012, and
the UN/WB/EU’s Joint Socio-Economic Assessment of
the impact of the 2011 crisis.
Despite interesting results with important
implications for humanitarian response and
programming, use of the monitoring results has
been inconsistent across actors. UNICEF staff
and other humanitarian actors, for example,
have been slow to utilise the analytic report as a
monitoring tool for programmatic adjustments,
even though sector experts from UNICEF were
integral members of the team that designed the
initial survey questionnaire. As a result,
opportunities to respond pre-emptively to
emerging problems – such as a measles outbreak
– were missed.
Concern over the lack of utilisation by
humanitarian actors on the ground prompted the
implementation team to administer a quick,
informal survey of recipients on the distribution
list in late November, as UNICEF began
planning for scaling up the initiative to the
national level. The UNICEF team assumed that
the data was useful, but if utilisation was as tepid
throughout the distribution list as it was within
the YCO, the team was prepared to reconsider
moving forward with the scaling-up effort. The
survey included only five questions pertaining
mostly to whether and how the data and analysis
were used. An overwhelming number of
respondents indicated that they indeed found the
data and analysis either useful or very useful,
with donors and embassies that had been
evacuated from Sana’a especially keen. Most
respondents reportedly used the information
from the survey to keep abreast of the rapidly
deteriorating situation on the ground, and used
the analysis as an advocacy tool to argue for
increased emergency response and funding.
Donors and aid organisations such as DFID,
USAID and GIZ incorporated the data into
situation analyses that informed their country
programme planning for 2012.
4 Lessons learned
4.1 Frequency
The monitoring project began in a country
context of rapidly worsening conditions,
including prices of food, fuel, transportation, and
water that were doubling and tripling within
weeks. While such situations may call for
frequent, biweekly surveys at the height of the
crisis, once the situation stabilises (even if it
stabilises under conditions that are arguably
devastating for vulnerable households) less
frequent monitoring is likely to be sufficient.
Patterns showing lack of movement among
indicators are a signal to shift to less frequent
data collection.
4.2 Relationship with respondents
Related to frequency, data collectors reported
rising tensions with respondents as weeks
became months of implementation. Although
respondents were expressly and clearly informed
at the outset of the project that data would be
collected every two weeks and that respondents
would not receive cash or other compensation,
respondent fatigue and frustration nonetheless
set in. Particularly with vulnerability monitoring,
where respondents are chosen precisely because
they are most likely to be in need or are most
rapidly affected by shocks, such misplaced hope
of assistance is not only understandable, but also
predictable. Monitoring projects face a dilemma,
however, of how to provide some support to
clearly struggling families while not affecting the
outcome of the survey. The project team sought
to offset respondents’ irritation by providing one-
off donations of back-to-school bags for children
in the targeted households; since the survey
began at a time when school was not in session, it
did not include school-related questions and so
the donations were not seen to directly tamper
with survey results. The design of the survey –
where the same households were repeatedly
queried, lent itself to this kind of fatigue. This
lesson has been taken into account for the scale-
up, and a new sampling strategy has been
devised to mitigate respondents’ frustration (for
more on the scale-up, see Section 5, below).
4.3 Utility
While the usefulness of the data appears to be
recognised by donors and embassies, the
monitoring project team must work harder
within UNICEF and among its cluster partners
to encourage staff to use data to monitor the
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situation and to mount proactive responses.
Missed opportunities around measles in
particular highlight that UNICEF and clusters
need to be drawn into a culture of ongoing
evidence-based planning for both programmatic
and emergency response. Part-and-parcel of a
stronger culture of evidence-based management,
the uptake of results would likely be encouraged
by the pre-identification of agreed-upon, sector-
specific triggers or benchmarks that can signal
when humanitarians should segue from situation
monitoring to mounting a response in order to
stave off an emergent crisis.
4.4 Sustainability
Begun as a response to an evolving emergency
situation, UNICEF’s vulnerability monitoring
project was not conceived of as a long-term
endeavour. Nonetheless, in recognition of the data
gap such monitoring fills, UNICEF has
transformed the survey in several ways that help it
speak better to the political, security, economic,
and social transitions likely to occur over the next
two years. These transformations better situate
the survey to be an instrument not only for
gathering data on vulnerable households
generally, but also, due to the revised sampling
strategy, to support monitoring of the efficacy of
social protection initiatives such as the SWF’s
cash transfer programme. By linking the survey in
this way to SFW programming, and working more
closely with SWF on strengthening its monitoring
and evaluation function, the project team expects
improved chances for project sustainability.
4.5 Local capacity
At the outset, the project team assumed that its
local partners would have the capacity to not only
collect the data but also analyse it in a timely and
meaningful way. This assumption proved too
ambitious, which resulted in a significant burden
on the UNICEF staff member who was managing
the project, as well as delays in issuing the
reports in the first months. Initially UNICEF had
hoped to address this shortcoming by bringing in
a project manager who could be fully dedicated to
managing the process as well as guaranteeing the
quality of the analytic reports and building the
capacity of The Democracy School for data
management and analysis. Although the team
selected a consultant with decades of experience
within the Central Statistical Organisation and a
strong background in managing nationwide
surveys, this addition, too, only slightly reduced
the burden on UNICEF staff. Local capacity for
the adoption of the electronic iPad system, on the
other hand, far exceeded expectations. The
lesson learned for project staff was to capitalise
on each organisation’s strengths (e.g. The
Democracy School was an excellent partner in
the data collection effort) and not to expect a
‘one-stop-shop’ for all services.
4.6 Impact of deteriorating country context on
implementation
The need for this project arose from the dire
conditions facing the country in 2011. Those
same conditions, however, also created enormous
challenges to those implementing the project.
Beginning in May and lasting until December
2011, electricity typically was available for only
two hours a day. Lack of electricity presented
challenges in recharging laptops and iPads,
entering data and drafting reports by
candlelight, and guaranteeing internet
connectivity for transmitting reports. To mitigate
these problems, UNICEF authorised The
Democracy School to purchase a small generator,
but fuel scarcity made this solution problematic
as well. (At the height of the crisis, queues for
petrol in Sana’a extended for up to 5km,
requiring three days for citizens to reach the
front of the line; diesel was only available on the
black market for six times the normal price.)
Fuel scarcity also contributed to higher costs for
the transportation needed for data collectors to
reach respondents. Over and above all of these
challenges, all staff related to the project – from
The Democracy School, to Prodigy, to UNICEF –
endured months of living in a conflict zone, with
periodic bouts of shelling in their residential
neighbourhoods, gun battles and numerous
checkpoints by state and non-state actors on key
access roads.13
Needless to say, such conditions put additional
strain on project-related staff and contribute to
delays and occasionally heightened tension or
pessimism within and among the teams. At the
same time, however, the project also provided an
opportunity for team building and boosted
UNICEF staff members’ feeling of purpose in an
environment that appeared otherwise out of
control. By managing to implement despite the
above challenges, team members were buoyed by
a sense of conviction that they were delivering
results that would benefit highly vulnerable
families at a time of crisis.
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5 Future directions
The pilot described above ended on 31 March
2012. Based on the experience of the pilot, as well
as important changes in the context that affect the
purpose of the project, the survey has been scaled
up in 2012 with some important modifications. All
21 governorates in Yemen will be covered in the
monthly data collection, and will include 7,560
households from all 21 governorates.
5.1 Coordination
Work processes to implement the national social
protection monitoring will be distributed
between two organisations, a national and an
international institution. Data collection will be
conducted by a national Yemeni research
institution, which will work closely with the
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
(IPC-IG), a UNDP research centre based in
Brazil. The IPC-IG will be responsible for
sampling, finalising the questionnaire, training
the enumerators, conducting data analysis, and
report writing. The national institution and the
IPC-IG will be working in close coordination with
a technical advisory group, which includes
representation from the Central Statistical
Organisation (CSO), the Social Welfare Fund
(SWF), the Social Fund for Development (SFD),
and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.
5.2 Methodology and sampling
Household data collection will be done on a
monthly basis, using a structured interviewer-
assisted questionnaire, which is based on the
pilot phase, but which has been revised through
a wide consultation process that included
national and international counterparts. As in
the pilot, in each household, the main female
care provider is identified as the key respondent.
The questionnaire includes questions that will be
asked at the beginning and at the end of the
survey, and others that will be repeated on a
monthly basis. It will include questions on
household (HH) characteristics, HH income,
risks and vulnerabilities facing children,
characteristics of family members, as well as
questions on specific sectors mainly on food
security, child protection, water and sanitation,
child health and education, and child nutrition,
including anthropometric measurement for
children 0–59 months.
The sample will be a random sample that will
include both SWF and non-SWF beneficiaries.
This will provide enough data to monitor the
difference in the coping mechanism of those
enrolled and not enrolled in the SWF. It will also
provide necessary data for possible referral of
struggling households to the SWF for inclusion in
one of the conditional/non-conditional cash
transfer programmes. In addition, efforts will be
made to ensure the access of poor HHs to basic
social services. As a result, the monitoring project
will provide data not only for more timely and
improved humanitarian interventions, but will
increase the overall evaluability of projects related
to the SWF as well as UNICEF.
5.3 Risks/constraints
The cost of the national social protection
monitoring is still under negotiation with the
implementing partners. The cost of fuel, and the
difficult geographic and security situation, in
addition to cultural aspects preventing female
data collectors in some areas from travelling
without ‘Mahram’ (a male relative/husband), will
add a huge burden to the overall budget. There
are continuous discussions on the best modalities
to get quality data while keeping the budget
reasonable.
5.4 Sustainability
Discussions have started with the CSO to take
the responsibility of the National Social
Protection Monitoring beyond 2013. CSO is in
favour to take the leadership, while ensuring that
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and the
SWF are part of the advisory group. UNICEF will
continue providing technical support to CSO and
other governmental partners.
6 Conclusion
Begun at the height of Yemen’s 2011 crisis,
UNICEF’s biweekly household survey provided
the only available data in the three targeted
governorates on how rapidly deteriorating
country conditions were affecting extremely
vulnerable households. Its innovative use of
electronic data entry systems, moreover, enabled
UNICEF to capitalise on the frequent periodicity
of the surveys by dramatically shortening the
time from field visit to report finalisation.
Despite the advantage that such timely data can
provide to humanitarian actors in situations of
extreme volatility, the survey’s full potential – to
mount early humanitarian action prior to the
outbreak of a full-blown crisis – remained
unrealised during the pilot phase.
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The opportunities missed by humanitarian
actors in Yemen point to a broader, more
systemic need for a paradigm-shift among the
humanitarian community about how it conceives
of timely response. While various rapid needs
assessment tools provide humanitarians with
excellent resources to define the parameters of
their response after an emergency strikes, the
international community still struggles with pre-
emptive action to reduce suffering and limit the
scope of an emergent crisis. Numerous efforts to
develop early warning and early action systems
in recent years among a wide array of UN and
NGO partners points to an awareness among
many that such a shift is necessary. Still, despite
these systems, as evidenced in Yemen as well as
in more visible crises such as the famine in the
Horn of Africa and the cholera outbreak in Haiti,
humanitarian actors have more work to do in
order to translate robust situation monitoring
into effective early action.
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Notes
1 Each of the other six RTMMV country studies
involved extensive fieldwork, such as
stakeholder workshops and focus group
discussions to assess the effectiveness of the
real-time initiative. However, travel
limitations due to the security situation
prevented a field visit to Yemen. As a result,
this RTM initiative was documented by the
Yemen Country Office and does not
incorporate findings from fieldwork as found
in the other country reports.
2 World Bank, European Union and the United
Nations, Joint Socio-Economic Assessment 2012: 40.
3 According to an informal periodic survey
conducted by UNICEF from April–August
2011 in 15 neighbourhoods in Sana’a, the
price of a tanker of water increased by 600 per
cent from April to July 2011; the increase
disproportionately affected poor urban
households, which are nearly 100 per cent
reliant upon trucked water. Meanwhile, prices
of basic food items increased by 43 per cent
from May to July, according to WFP Food
Price Index reporting.
4 Global Acute Malnutrition (an indicator of
population malnutrition informed by a weight
for height-based estimate of malnutrition
severity among young children).
5 Ministry of Public Health and Population,
Nutrition Survey among Under-5 in Al-Hodeidah
Governorate, Yemen, December 2011.
6 www.undp.org.ye/reports/Volume_I_Main_
Report.pdf.
7 Despite the stress of frequent reporting,
UNICEF Yemen chose to engage in biweekly
data collection in response to rapidly changing
conditions, which saw food and water prices
quadrupling within a month. Since it was
expected that the information from the survey
would be used to signal humanitarian needs
before they escalated into a full-blown
emergency, UNICEF Yemen was concerned
that a monthly survey would not be timely
enough.
8 Female genital mutilation/cutting.
9 The selection of cell phone companies,
moreover, would have presented possible
political challenges for the project. Yemen
possesses three cell phone carriers, with
uneven coverage throughout the country. One
of the main carriers is owned or otherwise
controlled by the regime, while the other
main carrier is owned by a group that aligned
with the opposition, thus threatening to turn
what should be a practical consideration of
the best technical solution into a political
choice. 
10 Fieldworkers continued to use the paper-
based system as well as the iPad system
throughout October as a backup in case of
unforeseen difficulties with the iPads. 
11 World Bank, European Union and the United
Nations, Joint Socio-Economic Assessment 2012:
124–25.
12 To detect causality in the data, IFPRI applied
a simple fixed-effects logit model. Food
insecurity was modelled as a function of
conflict, controlling for fixed effects (between
locations and over time) and a uniform trend
in the data. Several specifications were tested,
considering time lags in household food
security response to conflict and spill-over
effects of conflict occurring in the
neighbourhood.
13 In September 2011, for example, the road
from the centre of Sana’a to the airport was
dotted with 19 checkpoints manned by three
different official and unofficial groups, and
incidents of carjacking were prevalent.
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